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Rediscovering the Principle of Comity in English Private International Law1 
Thomas Schultz and Jason Mitchenson2 
 
Abstract: Academically speaking, comity is all but dead.  Cold-shouldered by the literature, 
the principle has become known as little more than a useless relic of the past.  But a review of 
the case law tells a very different story.  Comity thrives in the judicial decisions of English 
courts suggesting that, in particular areas of law, comity is alive and well.  In light of the 
disjunct between the literature and judicial practice, this article seeks to shed new light on the 
role of comity in English private international law.   Ultimately, it seeks to unbridle comity’s 
legal potential and reposition it as an important principle of English private international law 
worthy of further academic research. 
 
Résumé: Académiquement, le principe de la comity, ou courtoisie internationale, est presque 
morte. Ignoré par la doctrine, le principe est essentiellement perçu comme une relique inutile 
du passé. Mais si l’on porte un regard attentif à la jurisprudence, une histoire très différente 
émerge. La comity prospère dans les décisions des tribunaux anglais : à tout le moins dans 
des domaines particuliers du droit, la comity est résolument en vie. Partant de ce contraste 
entre doctrine et pratique judiciaire, les auteurs cherchent à apporter un nouvel éclairage sur 
le rôle de la comity dans le droit international privé anglais. A partir de là, il semble possible 
de débrider le potentiel juridique de la comity, en le repositionnant comme un principe 
important du droit international privé anglais méritant une attention soutenue de la doctrine. 
 
Abstract: Akademisch ist das Prinzip der Comity, oder comitas-Lehre, fast tot. Ignoriert von 
der akademischen Literatur wird das Prinzip im Wesentlichen als nutzloses Relikt der 
Vergangenheit wahrgenommen. Aber wenn man die Rechtsprechung genauer wahrnimmt, 
kommt eine ganz andere Geschichte ins Speil. Die comitas-Lehre blüht reglerecht in den 
Entscheidungen der englischen Gerichte: zumindest in bestimmten Bereichen des Rechts ist 
die comitas-Lehre entschlossen am Leben. Ausgehend von diesem Gegensatz zwischen 
akademischer Literatur und Gerichtspraxis beleuchten die Autoren die Rolle der comitas-
Lehre im englischen Internationalen Privatrecht neu. Von da an scheint es möglich, das 
Rechtspotential der comitas-Lehre freizusetzen und sie als wichtigen Grundsatz des 
englischen internationalen Privatrechts neu zu positionieren, dem die akademische Literatur 
anhaltende Aufmerksamkeit schenken sollte. 
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1. Introduction 
... English judges and textbook writers have frequently used the term comity of nations, ‘a phrase which is 
grating to the ear when it proceeds from a court of justice’.  Although the term has been often used, analysis 
of it reveals that it has been employed in a meaningless or misleading way.3 
1 The quote above is taken from Cheshire, North & Fawcett, one of the leading textbooks on the 
subject of English private international law.4  The authors leave little room for debate, denying 
that comity plays a positive role in the resolution of private international law disputes or in the 
development and application of private international law rules more generally.  If not 
meaningless, comity is at best misleading – masking the true means by which private 
international law disputes are or should be resolved. 
2 The authors’ opposition to comity is not surprising.  Appeals to comity are often met with 
resistance5 and the academic and judicial community’s inability to adequately define comity 
has only exacerbated its negative perception, fuelling the contempt with which it is often 
viewed.6  As F.A Mann put it, comity is often considered ‘one of the most ambiguous and multi-
faceted conceptions in the law’ and ‘so elusive and imprecise… to render its use unhelpful and 
confusing’.7  The result is that, academically speaking, comity is all but dead.  Cold-shouldered 
by the literature, it has become known as little more than a useless relic of the past. 
3 However, a review of the case law demonstrates that the lack of attention comity receives in 
the literature is unjustified for it thrives in judicial practice.8  As one court noted only recently: 
‘comity is not some empty phrase; it is the daily reality of our courts.’9  In light of the disjunct 
between the literature and judicial practice, this article seeks to shed new light on the 
importance and role of comity in English private international law.  Ultimately, this article 
                                                          
3 J. FAWCETT & J. CARRUTHERS, Cheshire, North & Fawcett: Private International Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 14th edn 2008) p. 5. 
4 This article uses the term comity, principle of comity or concept of comity interchangeably.  The concept is 
also known in some jurisdictions to varying degrees as comitas gentium, courtoisie internationale and 
völkercourtoisie. 
5 A. BRIGGS, ‘The Principle of Comity in Private International Law’ 354. Hague Lectures 2011, p. 87. 
6 Prior studies exist but this has not appeared to dispelled the general confusion surrounding the concept.  For 
other studies, in other contexts, see A. BRIGGS, 354. Hague Lectures 2011; W. DODGE, ‘International Comity in 
American Law’ 115. Columbia Law Review 2015; L. COLLINS, ‘Comity in Modern Private International Law’ in 
J. FAWCETT, Reform and Development of Private International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002) p. 
89; H. YNTEMA, ‘The Comity Doctrine’ 65. Michigan Law Review 1966; D. CHILDRESS, ‘Comity as Conflict: 
Resituating International Comity as Conflict of Laws’ 44. UC Davis Law Review 2010; J. PAUL, ‘The 
Transformation of International Comity’ 71. Law and Contemporary Problems 2007; A. WATSON, Joseph Story 
and the Comity of Errors (Athens: University of Georgia Press 1992); J. PAUL ‘Comity in International Law’ 32. 
Harvard International Law Journal 1991. 
7 F. MANN, Foreign Affairs in English Courts (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1986) p. 134-136. 
8 Similar remarks have been made by Lord Collins speaking from extensive experience at the Bench.  See, L. 
COLLINS in J. FAWCETT, Reform and Development of Private International Law. 
9 Re E (A Child) [2014] EWHC 6 (Fam), 1 WLR 2670 [20] (Munby J). 
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seeks to unbridle comity’s legal potential and reposition it as an important principle of private 
international law worthy of further academic research. 
2. A (Brief) History of Comity 
4 In 1648 the Treaties of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years War and in doing so consolidated the 
doctrine of sovereignty, helping to establish the necessary political foundations for the modern 
state system.10  It was thought that a clear distribution of regulatory power would be the most 
effective means of ending the Thirty Years War and reducing the risk of something similar 
occurring again in the future.11  Two of the central components of the doctrine of sovereignty 
– the principle of political self-determination and non-interference – sought to establish an 
international political-legal scene to achieve this aim.12 
5 The Thirty Years War had been fuelled by an unclear overlap of political, secular and spiritual 
power.13  It was in reaction to this that the doctrine of sovereignty emerged.  At the time of 
negotiations, it was thought that the creation of clear-cut states, whose regulatory scope 
extended no further than their individual territorial boundaries, would help contribute to the 
maintenance of peace.  But of course, the problem with the compartmentalisation of law and 
regulatory power is that it never truly matched the realities of social and economic life.14  
Whilst the law could be restricted to certain boundaries, people could not.  Thus, the problem 
quickly became, what were we to do with international disputes that fell within the regulatory 
scope of more than one State.  As international trade increased and multi-jurisdictional disputes 
became more frequent, there was a need to create a principle that facilitated international 
commerce without destroying the idea of sovereignty.15  This is how comity was born.16 
6 Comity was created to meet the political need to uphold the doctrine of sovereignty and the 
commercial and judicial need that often arise for law to move over the strict jurisdictional 
boundaries that exist between States.  In this sense, comity was created to uphold the 
Westphalian Equilibrium whilst adapting it to the realities of socio-economic life by balancing 
relevant political, commercial and judicial needs in a manner sensitive to States and private 
                                                          
10 Whilst it is commonly understood that the Treaties established the modern state this is, technically speaking, 
incorrect.  Rather the idea of sovereignty was strongly implicated in the negotiations of the Treaties.  L. GROSS, 
‘The Peace of Westphalia’ 42. American Journal of International Law 1949; N. SCHRIJVER, ‘The Changing 
Nature of State Sovereignty’ 70. British Year Book of International Law 1999; M. KOSKENNIEMI, ‘The Politics 
of International Law’ 1. European Journal of International Law 1990; S. BEAULAC, ‘The Westphalian Legal 
Orthodoxy – Myth or Reality?’ 2. Journal of the History of International Law 2000, p. 152. 
11 M. SHAW, International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 5th edn 2003) pp. 21-25. 
12 G. ABI-SAAB, ‘Cours Général de Droit International Public’ 207. Hague Lectures 1987 p. 48. 
13 S. BEAULAC, 2. J. Hist. Int. Law 2000, pp. 152-155; A. OSIANDER, ‘Sovereignty, International Relations, and 
the Westphalian Myth’ 55. International Organization 2001, p. 251. 
14 JAMES CRAWFORD, The Creation of States in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2nd edn 
2007) p. 10. 
15 D. CHILDRESS, 44. UC Davis Law Review 2010, pp. 20-22; H. YNTEMA, 65. Michigan Law Review 1966, p. 
26; L. GROSS, 42. Am. J. Int. Law 1949, p. 39. 
16 For more on the historical developments leading to the creation of comity, see T. SCHULTZ & D. HOLLOWAY, 
‘Les Origines de la Comity au Carrefour du Droit International Privé et du Droit International Public’ 138. 
Journal du Droit International 2011, pp. 863-886 and T. SCHULTZ & D. HOLLOWAY, ‘La Comity dans l’Histoire 
du Droit International Privé’ 139. Journal du Droit International 2012, pp. 571-595. 
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litigants.17  An analysis of recent case law demonstrates that comity continues to achieve this 
aim. 
3. The Principle of Comity 
7 The Supreme Court, and the House of Lords before it, has continually recognised that the 
United Kingdom – and the courts which form its judicial branch – observes the rules of 
comity.18  However, as it has yet to adopt a general definition of comity precisely what this 
means is open to debate.19  By reviewing the large number of cases that have considered the 
role of comity in the context of private international law, this article suggests that we can 
deduce an understanding of comity.  Such an understanding should remove some of the 
confusion surrounding the concept and provide courts with guidance in the exercise of their 
judicial power. 
8 The case law demonstrates that comity will be relevant in any circumstances where the 
application of law or the exercise of judicial power (be it domestic or foreign) has the potential 
to have an effect outside the jurisdictional boundaries of the State.  In this context, comity is a 
useful legal principle courts may use to determine what effect, if any, such law or judicial power 
should have beyond those boundaries.  Embodying the ideas of ‘recognition’ and ‘restraint’, 
comity enables courts to guide the development and application of their own private 
international law to balance and reflect in the law the political need of States to uphold 
sovereignty and the judicial need of private parties for law and judicial power, in certain 
circumstances, to have extra-jurisdictional effect.  In this sense, comity is a control mechanism, 
a tool courts can use to shape the development and application of their own private international 
law to reflect an array of public and private interests. 
9 In practice comity will be relevant in two common scenarios.  The first is in circumstances 
where a court is, prima facie, permitted to apply domestic law or exercise its judicial power in 
an ostensibly unlimited manner, but must determine how far and to what extent would be 
appropriate.  In such circumstances, courts may use comity to balance relevant sovereign and 
judicial interests to determine what effect, if any, domestic law or judicial power should have 
beyond the jurisdictional boundaries of the State.  The question is whether and to what extent 
the application of domestic law or exercise of judicial power should be ‘restrained’ in the 
context of the case.  Ordinarily, where there is a judicial need to apply domestic law or exercise 
                                                          
17 K. LIPSTEIN, Principles of the Conflict of Laws, National and International (London: Martinus Nijhoff 1981) 
p. 14. 
18 See most notably, Agbaje v Agbaje [2010] UKSC 13, 1 AC 628; Masri v Consolidated Contractors 
International (UK) Ltd (No 4) [2009] UKHL 43, [2010] 1 AC 90; R (Al-Skeini) v Secretary of State for Defence 
[2007] UKHL 26, [2008] 1 AC 153; Lawson v Serco Ltd (2006) UKHL 3, 1 All ER 823; Kuwait Airways Corp 
v Iraqi Airways Co (Nos 4 and 5) [2002] UKHL 19, 2 AC 883; The Abidin Daver [1984] AC 398 (HL); Lazard 
Brothers & Co v Midland Bank Ltd [1933] AC 289 (HL). 
19 Although, see Re Johnson [1903] 1 Ch 821, 829 where the court appears to implicitly accept the definition of 
comity expressed by the Supreme Court of the United States in Hilton v Guyot (1895) 159 US 113, 163-164: 
comity is ‘...neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon 
the other.  But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or 
judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of 
its own citizens, or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.’ 
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judicial power extra-jurisdictionally, comity will only call for restraint where it would unduly 
offend foreign sovereignty.  Whether or not the application of domestic law or exercise of 
judicial power will cause offence to foreign sovereignty is a question for the court in the 
individual circumstances of the case, but comity assists courts to balance the relevant sovereign 
and judicial interests in order to make such determinations. 
10 The second is in circumstances where a court must determine how far and to what extent it 
would be appropriate to allow foreign law or judicial power to have an effect within its own 
jurisdiction.  In such circumstances, courts may use comity to conduct the same balancing 
exercise to determine what effect, if any, foreign law or judicial power should have within their 
jurisdiction.  The question in these types of cases is whether, or to what extent, the application 
of foreign law or exercise of foreign judicial power should be ‘recognised’ in the context of the 
case.  Ordinarily, where there is a judicial need for foreign law or foreign judicial power to 
have an effect within the jurisdiction, comity will call for ‘recognition’ where it would not 
unduly offend domestic sovereignty.  Again, whether or not recognition will offend domestic 
sovereignty is a question for the court in the individual circumstances of the case, but comity 
assists courts to balance the relevant sovereign and judicial interests in order to make such 
determinations.  
11 Both scenarios are really two-sides of the same coin suggesting that comity plays a more 
general role in determining the appropriate scope of applicable law and judicial power.  In 
circumstances where the courts of one State seek to apply law or exercise judicial power extra-
jurisdictionally, the courts of another State will be required to determine whether, or to what 
extent, it should be recognised within their jurisdiction.  For courts seeking to apply law or 
exercise judicial power beyond their jurisdictional boundaries comity calls for ‘self-restraint’ 
where it would cause offence to foreign sovereignty.  For courts required to determine whether, 
and to what extent, it would be appropriate to recognise such laws or power within their 
jurisdiction, comity calls for ‘recognition’ where there is a judicial need to do so unless it would 
offend domestic sovereignty.  In this sense, comity allows courts to soften the strict rules of 
jurisdiction by acknowledging that, in certain circumstances, there is a judicial need for the law 
or judicial power of one State to have an effect within the jurisdiction of another. 
12 The balance of this article seeks to support this understanding of comity by analysing four areas 
of law where comity is particularly prevalent.  These include: (4) the interpretation of statute 
and international treaties; (5) the determination of jurisdiction; (6) the recognition of foreign 
judgments; and (7) judicial cooperation.  Importantly, this article does not seek to analyse all 
instance of comity.  Nor does it seek to provide an in-depth analysis of English private 
international law rules generally.  Rather, its aim is much more modest – it is simply to shed 
new light on the importance and role of comity in English private international law.  Ultimately, 
this article seeks to reposition comity as an important principle of English private international 
law worthy of further academic research. 
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4. The Interpretation of Statute and International Treaties 
 
4.1. Statutory Interpretation 
13 It is often the case that domestic legislation is drafted in ostensibly unlimited terms.  Where 
this is the case, a literal reading of such legislation will give one the impression that Parliament 
sought to legislate over all persons and matters falling within the ambit of such legislation – 
including those persons and matters that rightfully falling within the jurisdiction of foreign 
States.  It is of course problematic for States to exercise their power within the sovereign 
territory of other States.  Yet, there will be circumstances where there is a judicial need for 
domestic legislation to have such an effect.  It is perhaps no surprise then that in this context 
courts commonly rely on the principle of comity to determining the appropriate scope of such 
legislation.20 
14 Comity gives effect to these relevant political and judicial interests in the law by forming the 
basis for the principle that every statute is to be interpreted, so far as its language permits, as 
extending no further than the territorial boundaries of the State.  The courts have consistently 
held that this well-established cannon of statutory interpretation, referred to as the ‘assumption 
against extra-territoriality’, is based on comity.21  In Lawson22 Lord Hoffmann held: 
The general principle of construction is, of course, that legislation is prima facie territorial.  The United 
Kingdom rarely purports to legislate for the whole world. Some international crimes, like torture, are 
an exception.  But usually such an exorbitant exercise of legislative power would be both ineffectual 
and contrary to the comity of nations.23 
15 The assumption reflects the reality that, in most cases, the extra-territorial application of 
legislation will offend foreign sovereignty.24  However, it is merely an assumption and may be 
                                                          
20 A. BRIGGS, 354. Hague Lectures 2011, p 97. 
21 See most notably, Masri v Consolidated Contractors International (UK) Ltd (No 4) [2009] UKHL 43, [2010] 
1 AC 90 [10] (Lord Mance, with whom Lord Scott, Lord Rodger, Lord Walker & Lord Brown agreed); Société 
Eram Shipping Co Ltd v Cie Internationale de Navigation [2003] UKHL 30, [2004] 1 AC 260 [78]-[80] (Lord 
Millett); Clark v Oceanic Contractors Inc [1983] 2 AC 130 (HL); Also see, Al Sabah v Grupo Torras SA [2005] 
UKPC 1, 2 AC 333; Attorney General of Alberta v Huggard Assets Ltd [1953] AC 420 (PC) and R (Al-Skeini) v 
Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 26, [2008] 1 AC 153. 
22 Lawson v Serco Ltd (2006) UKHL 3, 1 All ER 823 (Lord Hoffmann, with whom Lord Woolf, Lord Roger, 
Lord Walker & Baroness Hale agreed). 
23 ibid [6] (Lord Hoffmann, with whom Lord Woolf, Lord Roger, Lord Walker & Baroness Hale agreed). 
24 Perry and Others v Serious Organised Crime Agency [2011] EWCA Civ 578, 1 WLR 2817, [157] (Hooper 
LJ): ‘If a legislature seeks to go beyond the basic function of government and legislate for foreigners outside its 
territory it is likely to displease other nations, whose function it is usurping... Unless Parliament has conferred 
on the court that power in language which is unmistakeable, the court is not to assume that Parliament intended 
to do that which might seriously affect foreigners who are not resident here and might give offence to foreign 
governments...  [T]wo concepts lie behind this rule, namely international comity and the concept that Parliament 
does not legislate where it has no effective power of enforcement.’  Also see,  R (Al-Skeini) v Secretary of State 
for Defence [2007] UKHL 26, [2008] 1 AC 153 [45] (Lord Roger): ‘It would usually be both objectionable in 
terms of international comity and futile in practice for Parliament to assert its authority over the subjects of 
another sovereign who are not within the United Kingdom.  So, in the absence of any indication to the contrary, 
a court will interpret legislation as not being intended to affect such people…’  The decision was effectively 
overruled by the European Court of Human Rights in Al-Skeini v United Kingdom (App No 55721/07, 7 July 
2011) 147 ILR 181 yet the House of Lords comments as to the role of comity remain sound. 
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displaced where there are significant judicial reasons why legislation should be read extra-
territorially and where it would not offend foreign sovereignty. 
16 Consider the particularly instructive case of Masri (No 4)25 where the House of Lords was 
required to determine the scope of Civil Procedure Rule 71.  Lord Mance, giving the judgment 
of the House, held that the wording of Civil Procedure Rule 71 did not contain any 
jurisdictional limitations and, on a literal reading, empowered courts to order company officers 
who resided outside the jurisdiction to attend a domestic court for examination. 
17 Noting the dictates of comity, his Lordship held that there would need to be significant judicial 
reasons to displace the assumption against extra-territoriality.26  Ultimately, his Lordship held 
that the claimant could not present such reasons.27  Conceding that the officer in question was 
likely able to shed light on many of the issues before the court, his Lordship held that an order 
summoning a person residing in a foreign jurisdiction would likely be perceived by foreign 
States as offending their sovereignty because it is a direct exercise of domestic judicial power 
within their jurisdiction.  His Lordship held that ‘eyebrows might be raised’ at the notion that 
Parliament had given the courts jurisdiction to summon anyone in the world to be examined in 
the context of Civil Procedure Rule 71.28 
18 Lord Mance noted that the result may have been different had there been greater judicial 
reasons to grant the order.  His Lordship gave the example of a case where examination was to 
be conducted for the purpose of public interest and the officer had fled the jurisdiction to escape 
liability.29  However, he held that making such an order would be very different to the order 
sought in the present case which would have required the mandatory attendance of someone 
abroad with no personal connection with the jurisdiction.30  Whilst the former may be permitted 
in the circumstances of the case, the latter would breach foreign sovereignty. 
4.2. The Interpretation of International Treaties 
19 States generally enter into treaties to develop transnational solutions to transnational 
problems.31  It follows then that there are significant judicial reasons why treaties should be 
interpreted in a transnationally consistent manner.  In this context, comity plays a key role in 
the interpretation of international treaties by placing restrictions on the court’s interpretive 
process in an effort to support the transnationally consistent interpretation of such instruments. 
                                                          
25 Masri v Consolidated Contractors International (UK) Ltd (No 4) [2009] UKHL 43, [2010] 1 AC 90. 
26 ibid [10]-[16] (Lord Mance, with whom Lord Scott, Lord Rodger, Lord Walker & Lord Brown agreed). 
27 ibid [26] (Lord Mance, with whom Lord Scott, Lord Rodger, Lord Walker & Lord Brown agreed). 
28 ibid [24]-[26] (Lord Mance, with whom Lord Scott, Lord Rodger, Lord Walker & Lord Brown agreed). 
29 ibid [20] (Lord Mance, with whom Lord Scott, Lord Rodger, Lord Walker & Lord Brown agreed).  His 
Lordship gave the example of Re Seagull Manufacturing Co Ltd [1993] Ch 345 (CA). 
30 Masri v Consolidated Contractors International (UK) Ltd (No 4) [2009] UKHL 43, [2010] 1 AC 90 [22] 
(Lord Mance, with whom Lord Scott, Lord Rodger, Lord Walker & Lord Brown agreed). 
31 Morris v KLM Royal Dutch Airlines [2002] UKHL 7, 2 AC 628 [12] (Lord Steyn); Re Deep Vein 
Thrombosis and Air Travel Group Litigation [2005] UKHL 72, [2006] 1 AC 495 [1] (Lord Scott). 
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In Morris,32 the House of Lords highlighted the importance of comity in this context holding 
that, in the interpretation of international treaties, comity requires that consideration be given 
to international case law to achieve the aim of transnational consistency.  Lord Hope held: 
In an ideal world the Convention should be accorded the same meaning by all who are party to it…  
Considerable weight should be given to an interpretation which has received general acceptance in 
other jurisdictions...33 
20 In Morris, Lord Mackay attached critical importance to two decisions of the Supreme Court of 
the United States, ultimately holding that they evidenced an international consensus as to the 
proper interpretation of the Warsaw Convention.  His Lordship held that, were it not for those 
decisions, he would have given more weight to the argument for a contrary interpretation.34  
Lord Hope agreed attaching similar importance to previous decisions in the United States, 
Australia and Israel.35 
21 It is self-evidently desirable that international treaties be construed in a uniform manner.  
Comity supports this judicial aim by requiring that courts recognise and give due regard to the 
decisions of foreign courts.  It is only by virtue of comity that English courts extend recognition 
to foreign decisions for this purpose.  Of course, comity does not demand that courts blindly 
follow international consensus – to do so would unduly constrain domestic sovereignty.  But it 
does require that they give due recognition to foreign decisions in order to achieve the aim of 
transnational consistency.36  By doing so, courts are able to reconcile the political need to 
uphold their domestic sovereignty with the judicial need to develop consistent transnational 
law. 
5. The Determination of Jurisdiction 
 
5.1. Adjudicating on the Laws and Acts of Foreign States 
22 There are few exercises of judicial power more likely to offend foreign sovereignty than for 
the courts to pass judgment on the laws and acts of foreign States.  Comity reflect this position 
in the law by placing significant restrictions on the exercise of judicial power where courts are 
asked to do so.  In this context, comity has shaped the development of two separate but 
intertwined doctrines of law: (1) the act of state doctrine; and (2) the doctrine of non-
justiciability.37  Whilst the former operates in respect of the legislative and executive acts of 
foreign States within their territory, 38  the later operates in respect of the legislative and 
                                                          
32 Morris v KLM Royal Dutch Airlines [2002] UKHL 7, 2 AC 628. 
33 ibid [81] (Lord Hope). 
34 ibid [7] (Lord Mackay). 
35 ibid [107]-[120] (Lord Hope). 
36 See also, Re Deep Vein Thrombosis and Air Travel Group Litigation [2005] UKHL 72, [2006] 1 AC 495; 
Barclay v British Airways Plc [2008] EWCA Civ 1419, [2010] QB 187. 
37 These doctrines may be broken down even further and apply differently in different contexts.  For a 
comprehensive discussion of the law in this area see, most notably, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Belhaj & Rahmatullah (No 1) v Straw & Ors [2017] UKSC 3. 
38 See, A M Luther v James Sagor & Co [1921] 3 KB 532 (CA) where the Court of Appeal held that an attempt 
in England by former owners to reclaim goods confiscated in Russia by the Soviet Government was not 
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executive acts of foreign States internationally.39  Both doctrines restrain courts from passing 
judgment on the laws and acts of foreign States.  However, neither serves as a complete bar 
recognising that in ‘exceptional circumstances’ it may be appropriate.40 
23 The act of state doctrine is a longstanding doctrine of Anglo-American jurisprudence.41  In 
Buck v Attorney General42 Diplock LJ held: 
As a member of the family of nations, the Government of the United Kingdom (of which this court 
forms part of the judicial branch) observes the rules of comity...  For the English court to pronounce 
upon the validity of a law of a foreign sovereign state within its own territory, so that the validity of 
that law became the res of the res judicata in the suit, would be to assert jurisdiction over the internal 
affairs of that state.  That would be a breach of the rules of comity.  In my view, this court has no 
jurisdiction so to do.43 
24 Twenty-five years later, the House of Lords referred to a related principle - the doctrine of ‘non-
justiciability’.44  Deriving from the same line of cases as the act of state doctrine, the House 
held that under the doctrine of non-justiciability courts may not adjudicate upon acts of foreign 
States on the international plane, even in an action between private parties, because they touch 
on State sovereignty.45 
25 Summarising the two doctrines, Lord Wilberforce held in Buttes Gas and Oil46 that they exist 
in such restrictive forms because they derive from the common principle of comity.47  In this 
context, comity reflects the political need to respect sovereignty by heavily favouring non-
adjudication.  Passing judgment on the acts of foreign States is so likely to cause offence to 
foreign sovereignty that both doctrines will apply even where there are significant judicial 
reasons to do so.  However, again, comity does not pose a complete bar to adjudication, 
recognising that there will be ‘exceptional circumstances’ where it is appropriate.  The case law 
demonstrates that the only real exception to these doctrines is where foreign laws or acts 
contravene international law, human rights or public policy. 
                                                          
permissible because the acts of state occurred within the State’s jurisdiction and could therefore not be 
questioned by English Courts. 
39 See, Buttes Gas and Oil Co v Hammer [1982] AC 888 (HL) where the House of Lords held it would not 
determine a dispute involving two oil companies operating in an area of contested sovereignty because 
resolution of the dispute would require that the court determine the boundaries of sovereign States. 
40 Kuwait Airways Corp v Iraqi Airways Co (Nos 4 and 5) [2002] UKHL 19, 2 AC 883; Buttes Gas and Oil Co v 
Hammer [1982] AC 888 (HL); Belhaj v Straw [2014] EWCA Civ 1394, [2015] 2 WLR 1105; Yukos Capital 
Sarl v OJSC Rosneft Oil Co (No 2) [2012] EWCA Civ 855, [2014] QB 458. 
41 Blad v Bamfield (1674) 36 ER 992, 3 Swans 604, 607 (Lord Nottingham); Duke of Brunswick v King of 
Hanover (1848) 9 ER 993, 2 HL Cas 1, 17 (Lord Cottenham).  See also, A M Luther v James Sagor & Co 
[1921] 3 KB 532 (CA) and Princess Paley Olga v Weisz [1929] 1 KB 718 (CA) citing the United States cases of 
Underhill v Hernandez (1897) 168 US 250 and Oetjen v Central Leather Co (1918) 246 US 297 as expressing 
the modern conception of the act of state doctrine. 
42 Buck v Attorney General [1965] Ch 745 (CA). 
43 ibid 770 (Diplock LJ). 
44 JH Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd v Department of Trade and Industry [1990] 2 AC 418 (HL) 499 (Lord Oliver, 
with whom Lord Keith & Lord Brandon agreed). 
45 ibid 499-500 (Lord Oliver, with whom Lord Keith & Lord Brandon agreed) citing earlier expression of the 
doctrine in Cook v Sprigg [1899] AC 572 (PC) and Secretary of State in Council of India v Kamachee Boye 
Sahaba (1859) 12 ER 388, 7 Moo Ind App 476 (PC). 
46 Buttes Gas and Oil Co v Hammer [1982] AC 888 (HL). 
47 ibid 932 (Lord Wilberforce, with whom Lord Fraser, Lord Russell, Lord Keith & Lord Bridge agreed). 
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26 A particularly instructive example of comity’s role in this area is the House of Lords’ decision 
in Kuwait Airways (Nos 4 and 5)48 where it held that the act of state doctrine was excluded by 
an exception founded in international law or public policy.  Lord Hope held: 
It is clear that very narrow limits must be placed on any exception to the act of state rule...  These limits 
demand that, where there is any room for doubt, judicial restraint must be exercised.  But restraint is 
what is needed, not abstention.  And there is no need for restraint on grounds of public policy where it 
is plain beyond dispute that a clearly established norm of international law has been violated.49 
27 Thus, comity demands restraint, restraint of the greatest kind.  But it does not require 
abstention, recognising that in exceptional circumstances it will be judicially necessary to 
exercise adjudicatory power.  A similar decision was handed down more recently by the 
Supreme Court in Belhaj 50  which concerned grave allegations of human rights and 
international law violations.  In that case, Lord Neuberger, on behalf of the majority, held that 
the acts alleged would never have been covered by the act of state doctrine.  But, if they had, 
the act of state doctrine would not have applied because it is subject to a public policy 
exception.  In his discussion of the doctrine’s scope, his Lordship held that ‘any treatment 
which amounts to a breach of jus cogens or preemptory norms would almost always fall within 
the public policy exception.’51  
28 The act of state doctrine does not however extend to foreign judicial acts.  However, the case 
law demonstrates that comity continues to be relevant.  In Altimo Holdings52 the Privy Council 
held: 
Comity requires that the court be extremely cautious before deciding that there is a risk that justice will not 
be done in the foreign country by the foreign court, and that is why cogent evidence is required.53 
The true position is that there is no rule that the English court (or Manx court) will not examine the question 
whether the foreign court or the foreign court system is corrupt or lacking in independence.  The rule is that 
considerations of international comity will militate against any such finding in the absence of cogent 
evidence...54 
29 In this sense comity forms the basis for a presumption that courts will not adjudicate on foreign 
judicial acts unless there are significant judicial reasons why they should.  The presumption 
                                                          
48 Kuwait Airways Corp v Iraqi Airways Co (Nos 4 and 5) [2002] UKHL 19, 2 AC 883. 
49 ibid [137]-[140] (Lord Hope). See also, Oppenheimer v Cattermole [1976] AC 249 (HL) where the House of 
Lords held that, although nationality falls within the regulatory scope of individual States, it would not 
recognise decrees of the Nazi Government which deprived Jewish immigrants of their German nationality and 
confiscated their property.  Lord Cross (227-228) held: ‘A judge should, of course, be very slow to refuse to 
give effect to the legislation of a foreign state in any sphere in which, according to accepted principles of 
international law, the foreign state has jurisdiction… but what we are concerned with here is legislation that 
takes away without compensation from a section of the citizen body singled out on racial grounds all their 
property on which the state passing the legislation can lay its hands and, in addition, deprives them of their 
citizenship.  To my mind a law of this sort constitutes so grave an infringement of human rights that the courts 
of this country ought to refuse to recognise it as a law at all.’ 
50 Belhaj & Rahmatullah (No 1) v Straw & Ors [2017] UKSC 3. 
51 Ibid [168] (Lord Lord Neuberger, with whom Lord Wilson, Lady Hale & Lord Clarke agreed). 
52 Altimo Holdings and Investment Ltd v Kyrgyz Mobil Tel Ltd [2011] UKPC 7, [2012] 1 WLR 1804.  Also see, 
Yukos Capital Sarl v OJSC Rosneft Oil Co (No 2) [2012] EWCA Civ 855, [2014] QB 458. 
53 ibid [97] (Collins SCJ, judgment of the Privy Council). 
54 ibid [101] (Collins SCJ, judgment of the Privy Council). 
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may only be displaced where there is cogent evidence that there is a real risk that justice will 
not be obtained in the foreign court.  However, in the absence of such evidence, comity 
demands that courts start with the working assumption that all foreign courts can and seek to 
do justice.55 
30 In the Yukos case, 56  the Court of Appeal explained why comity’s role differs in cases 
concerning foreign legislative and executive act and in cases concerning foreign judicial acts.  
The Court noted that legislative and executive acts are on their own plane – internationally 
States are responsible only under international law.  Courts however are always responsible for 
their acts – internationally they are responsible to other courts in the sense that their judgments 
must be capable of being recognised.  The result is that where foreign judicial acts are being 
relied on in domestic proceedings, domestic courts will be permitted to review such acts where 
there is cogent evidence that they are contrary to the rule of law.57 
31 It is not that foreign judicial acts are less deserving of respect.  Rather, it is that the examination 
of foreign judicial conduct in these types of cases arises before the courts where it is being 
relied on to assert a domestic legal right.  The question of whether that right exists is within the 
jurisdiction of domestic courts.  If comity precluded courts from conducting an examination of 
foreign judicial conduct in such circumstances it would inappropriately place respect for 
foreign sovereignty above domestic sovereignty.  The case law demonstrates that courts 
consider the appropriate balance to be that they proceed with extreme caution - only passing 
judgement where there is cogent evident capable of displacing the presumption that the foreign 
court has acted in accordance with the rule of law.58 
5.2. The Exercise of Judicial Powers that Effect Foreign Judicial Process 
32 Comity also plays a key role in guiding the exercise of judicial power where a court is asked 
to make an order that would conflict with or undermine the laws of a foreign State or a pre-
existing order of its courts.  In circumstances where a court is asked to make such an order 
comity favours restriction of the power.  However, once again, it will not act as a complete bar 
but rather requires that courts be ‘very slow’ to make such orders. 59  More recent case law 
                                                          
55 ibid; Yukos Capital Sarl v OJSC Rosneft Oil Co (No 2) [2012] EWCA Civ 855, [2014] QB 458; Al-Koronky v 
Time- Life Entertainment Group Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 1123, [2006] CP Rep 47; Cherney v Deripaska [2008] 
EWHC 1530, [2009] 1 All ER (Comm) 333. 
56 Yukos Capital Sarl v OJSC Rosneft Oil Co (No 2) [2012] EWCA Civ 855, [2014] QB 458. 
57 ibid [87] (Rix LJ, judgment of the Court). 
58 ibid [87]-[91] (Rix LJ, judgment of the Court). 
59 Ralli Bros v Compania Naviera Sota y Aznar [1920] 2 KB 287 (CA) 304 (Scrutton LJ): ‘This country should 
not in my opinion assist or sanction the breach of the laws of other independent States.’; Al Habtoor v 
Fotherington [2001] EWCA Civ 186, 1 FLR 951 [44] (Thorpe LJ with whom Laws and Penry-Davey LJJ 
agreed): ‘In my opinion the courts of this jurisdiction should be very slow to make orders that directly conflict 
with pre-existing orders in any friendly foreign state. The principle of comity requires no less.’  Also see, 
Mercredi v Chaffe [2011] EWCA Civ 272, 2 FLR 515; Regazzoni v KC Sethia (1944) Ltd [1958] AC 301 (HL); 
Foster v Driscoll [1929] 1 KB 470 (CA). 
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demonstrates that in certain cases comity goes even further obliging courts to actively support 
foreign proceedings.60 
33 In this areas of law there are two particular judicial orders commonly associated with comity: 
(1) the anti-suit injunction; and (2) the order of forum non conveniens.  An anti-suit injunction 
is an in personam judicial order aimed at restraining a party from commencing or continuing 
proceedings in a foreign court for ‘reasons of justice’.61  The courts have, on a number of 
occasions, stressed the in personam nature of anti-suit injunctions in an attempt to easy foreign 
sovereign concerns – particularly in the European Union.  The argument is that, if anti-suit 
injunctions act to restrain parties, rather than foreign courts, they should not be considered 
offensive to foreign sovereignty. 62   However, in more recent cases, the courts have 
acknowledged that anti-suit injunctions indirectly interfere with foreign courts – effectively 
restraining them from determining their own jurisdiction by precluding parties from 
commencing or continuing proceedings.63 
34 The question as to comity’s role in this area becomes all the more complex because of the 
United Kingdom’s participation in the European Union and its recent vote to leave.  As a 
member State, courts of the United Kingdom are obliged to apply European regulations and 
are subject to decisions of the European Court of Justice (ECJ).  In the context of anti-suit 
injunctions this had led to different practices emerging between English courts vis-à-vis other 
member States, and English courts vis-à-vis non-member States.  
35 With the obvious exception of the United Kingdom, most member States consider anti-suit 
injunctions to unacceptably infringe sovereignty.  This position is reflected in the Brussels 
Regime64 which resolves jurisdictional conflicts by application of the civil law rule of lis 
                                                          
60 See Section 7 (Judicial Cooperation).  See also, Mercredi v Chaffe [2011] EWCA Civ 272, 2 FLR 515 [63] 
(Thorpe LJ): ‘as a matter of comity and the collaboration of courts within the European Union the London judge 
had an obligation to support the proper conclusions of the French court or, at the least, not to enter into a 
litigation strategy to undermine the order…’ 
61 Airbus Industrie GIE v Patel [1999] 1 AC 119 (HL) 124 (Lord Goff, with whom Lord Slynn, Lord Steyn, 
Lord Clyde & Lord Hutton agreed).  
62 Turner v Grovit [2001] UKHL 65, [2002] 1 WLR 107 [26] (Lord Hobhouse, with whom Lord Nicholls & 
Lord Hoffmann agreed): ‘The making of a restraining order does not depend upon denying, or pre-empting, the 
jurisdiction of the foreign court… Restraining orders come into the picture at an earlier stage and involve not a 
decision upon the jurisdiction of the foreign court but an assessment of the conduct of the relevant party in 
invoking that jurisdiction.  English law makes these distinctions.’  Also see, more recently, Impala Warehousing 
and Logistics (Shanghai) Co Ltd v Wanxiang Resources (Singapore) PTE Ltd [2015] EWHC 811, 2 All ER 
(Comm) 234, 144 (Blair J): ‘An order of this kind is made in personam against a party subject to the court's 
jurisdiction by way of requiring compliance with agreed terms.  It does not purport to have direct effect on the 
proceedings in the [foreign State]. This court respects such proceedings as a matter of judicial comity.’ 
63 Turner v Grovit [2001] UKHL 65, [2002] 1 WLR 107 [28] (Lord Hobhouse, with whom Lord Nicholls & 
Lord Hoffmann agreed): ‘Similarly, English law attaches a high importance to international comity and the 
English court has in mind how the restraining order will be perceived by foreign courts...  It is recognised that to 
make an order against a person who is a party to proceedings before a foreign court, may be treated as an 
interference (albeit indirect) in the foreign proceedings.’  See also, Airbus Industrie GIE v Patel [1999] 1 AC 
119 (HL) 138 (Lord Goff, with whom Lord Slynn, Lord Steyn, Lord Clyde & Lord Hutton agreed). 
64 On 10 January 2015 EU Regulation 1215/2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters (Brussels Recast) entered into force.  In doing so, it replaced 
previous iterations of the Brussels Regime, including EU Regulation 44/2001 (Brussels Regulation) and the 
original 1968 Brussels Convention (collectively, the Brussels Regime). 
 13 
pendens.65  In Turner, the ECJ outlawed the use of anti-suit injunctions between member States 
on the basis that it undermines the jurisdictional rules of the Brussels Regime and breaches 
member State sovereignty.66  However, anti-suit injunctions are still available to courts where 
the competing jurisdiction is not a member State.67  In such circumstances, comity plays a key 
role in guiding the appropriate exercise of the power to grant such orders.  The case law 
demonstrates that comity requires courts to exercise a ‘great level of caution’ when 
contemplating an anti-suit injunction and that they be granted only in ‘exceptional cases’.68 
36 The future of the anti-suit injunction is difficult to predict.  Arguably, they will continue to be 
available to courts where the competing jurisdiction is not a member State.  However, the 
United Kingdom’s recent vote to leave the European Union means that, in the not too distant 
future, English courts may no longer be bound by the Brussels Regime or decision of the ECJ.69  
The result may be that anti-suit injunctions become available even where the competing 
jurisdiction is a member State. 
37 Comity dictates that courts must have personal jurisdiction over the person subject of the anti-
suit injunction70 and that the domestic forum have a sufficient connection with the matter.71  
Where there are two or more available forums for trial, comity requires that the domestic forum 
be the natural forum before an anti-suit injunction be granted.72  Where there is little connection 
                                                          
65 Article 31(1) of the Brussels Recast provides that ‘where actions come within the exclusive jurisdiction of 
several courts, any court other than the court first seised shall decline jurisdiction in favour of that court.’ 
66 Turner v Grovit [2005] 1 ECR 3565 (C-159/02) 24-27, 31. 
67 See recently, Petter v EMC Europe Ltd, EMC Corporation [2015] EWHC 1498 (QB) [68]-[69] (Cooke LJ): 
‘The ECJ's ruling in Turner v Grovit [2004] 1 ECR 3565 (C-159/02) held that anti-suit injunctions had no part 
to play in the scheme of the Regulation...  I consider that the grant of anti-suit injunctions is essentially inimical 
to the Regulation which certainly does not allow such in the context of jurisdictional disputes where the 
jurisdictions in question are the courts of Member States.  Common Law jurisdiction may grant anti-suit 
injunctions outside the context of the Recast Regulation.'  See also, OT Africa Line Ltd v Magic Sportswear 
Corp [2005] EWCA Civ 710, [2006] 1 All ER (Comm) 32. 
68 Turner v Grovit [2001] UKHL 65, [2002] 1 WLR 107; Donohue v Armco [2001] UKHL 64, [2002] 1 All ER 
749; Airbus Industrie GIE v Patel [1999] 1 AC 119 (HL); Société Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v Lee Kui 
Jak [1987] AC 871 (PC); OceanConnect UK Ltd v Angara Maritime Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 1050, [2011] 1 All 
ER (Comm) 193; Deutsche Bank AG v Highland Crusader Partners LP [2009] EWCA Civ 725, [2010] 1 WLR 
1023; Masri v Consolidated Contractors International (UK) Ltd (No 3) [2008] EWCA Civ 625, [2009] QB 503; 
Samengo-Turner v J&H Marsh & McLennan (Services) Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 723, 2 All ER (Comm) 813; 
Through Transport Mutual Insurance Association (Eurasia) Ltd v New India Assurance Association Co Ltd 
[2004] EWCA Civ 1598, [2005] 1 All ER (Comm) 715. 
69 The Brussels Regime is part of the law of the United Kingdom and thus the vote to leave is not sufficent to 
change current practice.  The Brussels Regime would only cease to be binding if Parliament withdrew from the 
European Union Treaty and domestic legislation that gives it effect. 
70 Deutsche Bank AG v Highland Crusader Partners LP [2009] EWCA Civ 725, [2010] 1 WLR 1023 [50] 
(Toulson LJ, with whom Goldring & Carnwath LJJ agreed); Glencore International AG v Metro Trading 
International Inc (No 3) [2002] EWCA Civ 528, 2 All ER (Comm) [42] (Rix LJ, with whom Walker & Morritt 
LJJ agreed). 
71 Airbus Industrie GIE v Patel [1999] 1 AC 119 (HL) 138 (Lord Goff, with whom Lord Slynn, Lord Steyn, 
Lord Clyde & Lord Hutton agreed): ‘As a general rule, before an anti-suit injunction can properly be granted by 
an English court to restrain a person from pursuing proceedings in a foreign jurisdiction, in cases of the kind 
under consideration in the present case, comity requires that the English forum should have a sufficient interest 
in, or connection with, the matter in question to justify the indirect interference with a foreign court which an 
anti-suit injunction entails.’ 
72 Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460 (HL); Connelly v RTZ Corporation Plc [1998] AC 
854 (HL); Seaconsar Far East Ltd v Bank Markazi Jomhouri Islami Iran [1994] 1 AC 438 (HL); Lubbe v Cape 
Plc [2000] 1 WLR 1545 (HL); Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v Lee Kui Jak [1987] AC 871 (PC). 
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with the domestic forum granting an anti-suit injunction may be perceived by the foreign State 
as a breach of their sovereignty, particularly if that foreign State has a comparatively stronger 
connection with the matter.73   
38 Once the necessary connection with the forum has been established, it has to be demonstrated 
that ‘the ends of justice’ require an anti-suit injunction.74  In other words, comity requires that 
there be significant judicial reasons for the anti-suit injunction.  Generally speaking, this may 
be satisfied where foreign proceedings are vexatious or oppressive,75 unconscionable,76 in 
breach of an exclusive jurisdiction or arbitration clause77 or against public policy.78  Even 
where there is a sufficient connection with the domestic forum, and there are significant judicial 
reasons why an anti-suit injunction should be granted, it does not follow that an anti-suit 
injunction should automatically be granted.  Comity will continue to favour restriction of the 
judicial power because anti-suit injunctions, by their very nature, interfere with the judicial 
process of foreign courts.  Comity therefore demands the court ask itself the additional question 
whether granting an anti-suit injunction would unacceptably infringe foreign sovereignty.  In 
asking this question, comity requires that courts recognise that foreign courts may not 
necessarily determine the strength of their connection with the matter in the same way domestic 
courts do.79 
39 A particularly instructive example of the role of comity in this area is the Court of Appeal’s 
decision in Bloom.80  In that case, creditors of an English company, which had entered into 
administration pursuant to an English court order, started proceedings in the United States for 
sums allegedly due from the company and obtained ex parte attachment orders against the 
company’s assets.  The creditors deliberately failed to inform the English administrators of the 
foreign proceedings.  Unaware, the administrators paid sums of money to a post-administration 
supplier to the company, which went to the supplier’s account in New York where it became 
subject to attachment.  The administrators applied to an English court for an anti-suit injunction 
restraining the creditors from taking any steps in the United States proceedings to seek a 
                                                          
73 Airbus Industrie GIE v Patel [1999] 1 AC 119 (HL) 138 (Lord Goff, with whom Lord Slynn, Lord Steyn, 
Lord Clyde & Lord Hutton agreed); British Airways Board v Laker Airways Ltd [1985] AC 58 (HL); Deutsche 
Bank AG v Highland Crusader Partners LP [2009] EWCA Civ 725, [2010] 1 WLR 1023. 
74 Glencore International AG v Metro Trading International Inc (No 3) [2002] EWCA Civ 528, 2 All ER 
(Comm) [42] (Rix LJ, with whom Walker & Morritt LJJ agreed); Société Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v 
Lee Kui Jak [1987] AC 871 (PC). 
75 Turner v Grovit [2001] UKHL 65, [2002] 1 WLR 107; Airbus Industrie GIE v Patel [1999] 1 AC 119 (HL); 
Glencore International AG v Metro Trading International Inc (No 3) [2002] EWCA Civ 528, 2 All ER 
(Comm); Sabah Shipyard (Pakistan) Ltd v Pakistan [2002] EWCA Civ 1643, 2 Lloyd’s Rep 571. 
76 South Carolina Insurance Co v Assurantie Maatschappij de Zeven Provincien NV [1987] AC 24 (HL); 
Barclays Bank Plc v Homan [1992] BCC 757 (CA); Midland Bank Plc v Laker Airways Ltd [1986] QB 689 
(CA).  
77 Donohue v Armco [2001] UKHL 64, [2002] 1 All ER 749; Deutsche Bank AG v Highland Crusader Partners 
LP [2009] EWCA Civ 725, [2010] 1 WLR 1023; OT Africa Line Ltd v Magic Sportswear Corp [2005] EWCA 
Civ 710, [2006] 1 All ER (Comm) 32. 
78 Barclays Bank Plc v Homan [1992] BCC 757 (CA); Stichting Shell Pensioenfonds v Krys [2014] UKPC 41, 
[2015] AC 616. 
79 Deutsche Bank AG v Highland Crusader Partners LP [2009] EWCA Civ 725, [2010] 1 WLR 1023 [50] 
(Toulson LJ, with whom Goldring & Carnwath LJJ agreed). 
80 Bloom v Harms Offshore GmbH & Co [2009] EWCA Civ 632, [2010] Ch 187. 
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judgment in favour of their monetary claims.  Upholding the decision to grant an anti-suit 
injunction, the Court of Appeal held: 
The comity owed by the courts of different jurisdictions to each other will normally make it 
inappropriate for the court to grant injunctive relief affecting procedures in a court of foreign 
jurisdiction.  In this particular case, this court recognises that the [United States] bankruptcy and 
district courts are experienced in commercial and insolvency matters.  Nonetheless, the conduct of the 
creditor against whom an injunction is sought, and the circumstances of the attachment of the property 
of the company, may justify the grant of an injunction despite the strong presumption that this court 
will not interfere with the proceedings of a foreign court.81 
40 Conducting a comity-based analysis, Burton LJ, on behalf of the Court, highlighted the factors 
he considered relevant in upholding the anti-suit injunction.  Determining the strength of the 
connection with the domestic forum, his Lordship noted that the company was incorporated 
and had its place of business in England, neither the company nor its creditors carried on 
business in the United States and the company was in administration under English court 
orders.  Conversely, the creditors had no real connection with the United States – they 
commenced proceedings simply to subvert the English court orders.  Reviewing the judicial 
reasons in favour of granting the anti-suit injunction his Lordship held that the creditors had 
purposely failed to inform the United States Court that the company was in administration in 
England and had mislead the United States Court to gain a better position.  The attachments 
did not fasten on any pre-administration property in New York but rather their success 
depended on property coming into the United States Court’s jurisdiction during administration.  
Burton LJ concluded that the conduct was unconscionable and thus upheld the anti-suit 
injunction.82 
41 Comity has also played a key role in the development of the doctrine of forum non conveniens 
which permits courts to decline jurisdiction where a matter would more appropriately be 
resolved by a foreign court. 83   The doctrine is one of the most commonly recognised 
expressions of comity demonstrating respect for foreign sovereignty by deference of judgment.  
Like anti-suit injunctions, the Brussels Regime has altered the common law.  However, the new 
Brussels Recast regulates grants of stays in general effectively superseding the position at 
common law.   
42 Despite this, it is important to review the case law surrounding the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens for three reasons.  First, it enables us to develop a more informed understanding of 
comity in judicial practice.  Second, much of the case law in this area may provide significant 
guidance in the application of the limited forum non conveniens principle recently introduced 
in the new Brussels Recast.  And third, as the United Kingdom has recently voted to leave the 
European Union, courts may, in the not too distant future, revert back to the common law 
position. 
                                                          
81 ibid [27] (Burton LJ, with whom Chadwick & Ward LJJ agreed). 
82 ibid [27]-[30] (Burton LJ, with whom Chadwick & Ward LJJ agreed). 
83 The Abidin Daver [1984] AC 398 (HL); Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460 (HL). 
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43 The doctrine of forum non conveniens is deeply rooted in the principle of comity.84  In Abidin 
Daver Lord Diplock noted that the introduction of the doctrine marked an essential change in 
judicial attitude towards foreign courts – in his words, a move from ‘judicial chauvinism’ to 
‘judicial comity.’85  Under the doctrine: 
... a national court may decline to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that a court in another State, 
which also has jurisdiction, would objectively be a more appropriate forum for the trial of the action, 
that is to say, a forum in which the case may be tried more suitably for the interest of all the parties and 
the ends of justice.86 
44 Similar to the law surrounding anti-suit injunctions, comity demands that courts focus on the 
comparative ‘connecting factors’ between the matter and the competing jurisdictions.  If 
jurisdiction is a matter of right in the domestic forum, a stay may only be granted where there 
is another forum ‘clearly or distinctly more appropriate’.  If no other available forum is ‘clearly 
or distinctly more appropriate’ the court will ordinarily refuse to grant a stay.  However, if there 
is the court ordinarily will grant a stay unless there are reasons of justice which require that a 
stay be refused.87 
45 The factors to be taken into account in making this determination necessarily go to the relevant 
sovereign and judicial interests at play.  Often these interests will point in the same direction.  
It is obviously judicially desirable that matters be heard in the most appropriate forum.  
Generally, that forum which has the strongest connection will also be the forum most capable 
of doing justice to the parties.  Further, it is generally in sovereign interests that courts hear 
matters with which they have the strongest connection.  The doctrine of forum non conveniens 
permits courts to reconcile these interests by deferring judgment to foreign courts that have a 
stronger connection with the matter.   
46 Take for example the particularly instructive case of Re Harrods (Buenos Aires) Ltd88 where 
the Court of Appeal held that the primary judge should have granted a stay in favour of 
Argentinian proceedings.  Of particular note is the judgment of Bingham LJ who conducted a 
comprehensive comity-based analysis: 
It is common ground that the factors connecting this action with the Argentine forum are strong and 
obvious.  All the economic, logistical and management considerations which loom large in any 
substantial action point strongly towards Argentina.  The company carried on business, and the acts 
complained of were done, there not here.  The witnesses are there, not here, and in the main speak 
Spanish, not English, a significant matter in an action where credibility is very much in issue.  The 
documents and records are there, not here, and are in Spanish, not English.  The court there would 
bring to the evaluation of factual evidence a familiarity with local conditions which a court here would 
necessarily lack.  Expert evidence would be needed here which would not be needed there.  The court 
there would be much better placed to assess the significance of related proceedings which have already 
                                                          
84 The Abidin Daver [1984] AC 398 (HL). 
85 ibid 411 (Lord Diplock). 
86 Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460 (HL) 476 (Lord Goff, with whom Lord Keith, Lord 
Templeman, Lord Griffiths & Lord Mackay agreed).  See also Sim v Robinow (1892) 19 R (Ct of Sess) 665, 668 
(Lord Kinnear). 
87 Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460 (HL) 475-478 (Lord Goff, with whom Lord Keith, 
Lord Templeman, Lord Griffiths & Lord Mackay agreed); The Abidin Daver [1984] AC 398 (HL) 415-416 
(Lord Keith). 
88 Re Harrods (Buenos Aires) Ltd [1992] Ch 72 (CA). 
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taken place there.  While an English court called on to try this case would no doubt do so as best it 
could, the difficulties would in my view be such as to make the reliability of the outcome 
problematical. 
The factor which is relied on as connecting this action with England is the incorporation of the 
company here… [However] where nothing appears to turn on the details of the company’s constitution, 
the ultra vires rule being apparently the same in both jurisdictions, these considerations seem to me to 
deprive the company’s English incorporation of almost all the force it might otherwise have.89 
47 Engaging in this balancing exercise his Lordship was able to weigh all relevant sovereign and 
judicial interests.  In particular, he noted that there were significant judicial reasons why the 
matter should be heard in Argentina and that these same factors lead to its sovereign connection.  
Likewise, despite noting that the company was incorporated in England, the fact that the case 
did not turn on the matter, meant that it was a comparatively weak connecting factor. 
48 Under the new Brussels Recast, stays on grounds of forum non conveniens continue to be 
outlawed between member States.  However, a new limited forum non conveniens principle 
has been introduced that allows member State courts to defer to non-member State courts if 
satisfied that a stay is ‘necessary for the proper administration of justice’.90  Recital 24 states 
that when making this determination courts should assess all the circumstances of the case, 
including but not limited to, the connection between the facts and the parties to the non-member 
State, the stage of the proceedings in the non-member State and whether or not the non-member 
State court is expected to give the judgment within a reasonable time. 
49 This new provision provides courts with the discretion to stay proceedings based on interests 
of justice – not dissimilar to the doctrine of forum non conveniens at common law.  Likewise, 
the criteria in Recital 24 is very similar to the ‘connecting factors’ and ‘interests of justice’ used 
by domestic courts in their application of the doctrine.  Whilst the new Brussels Recast has 
adopted a different test for granting stays, the case law analysed above may be relevant in 
determining whether a stay is ‘necessary for the proper administration of justice’.  Arguably, 
the wealth of case law balancing sovereign and judicial interests may be particularly valuable 
for civil law member State courts who have not traditionally had the ability to grant stays on 
grounds of forum non conveniens. 
6. The Recognition of Foreign Judgments 
50 As States may only enforce their laws and acts within their jurisdictional boundaries it follows 
that the judgments of their courts do not, by themselves, have force within the jurisdiction of 
other States.91  This is of course commercially and judicially undesirable – private litigants 
have an interest in avoiding the costs and injustice of repeat litigation whilst States have a 
common interests in promoting international commerce.  Thus, States have developed rules 
                                                          
89 ibid 124-126 (Bingham LJ, with whom Stocker LJ agreed). 
90 Brussel Recast, article 33. 
91 Gage v Bulkeley (1744) 27 ER 824, 824 (Lord Hardwicke): ‘every sentence, having its authority from the 
sovereign in whose dominions it is given, cannot bind the jurisdiction of foreign courts, who own not the same 
authority, and have a different sovereign, and are only bound by judicial sentence given under the same 
sovereign power by which they themselves act...’ 
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regulating the recognition of foreign judgments to promote these interests without infringing 
sovereignty.   
51 Today the obligation to recognise foreign judgments is primarily contained in European 
regulations or domestic legislation.  But, it also exists at common law.  The case law 
demonstrates that this obligation was originally based on comity.92  The Court of Appeal noted 
in Rubin v Eurofinance SA:93 
At first enforcement was founded on the doctrine of comity.  Then Parke B. explained in Williams v 
Jones [1845] 13 M.W. 628 at 633: ‘where a court of competent jurisdiction has adjudicated a certain 
sum to be due from one person to another, a legal obligation arises to pay that sum, on which an action 
of debt to enforce the judgment may be maintained.  It is in this way that the judgments of foreign and 
colonial courts are supported and enforced.’  That appears to be the modern position.94 
52 The case law appears to suggest that comity is no longer the basis for the recognition of foreign 
judgments at common law.95  However, these cases, starting with the decision in Williams, 
suggest that comity was cast aside because it was thought to entail nothing more than ‘mere 
courtesy’ towards foreign States.  The courts of the time were concerned that ‘mere courtesy’ 
was simply not a strong enough basis upon which to ground an obligation to recognise foreign 
judgments.96  Admittedly, if comity is considered to be nothing more than ‘mere courtesy’ then 
it is indeed relatively useless.  But, as the Supreme Court noted only recently - comity is a term 
of ‘very elastic content’.97  At its weakest, it may be used simply to denote courtesy toward 
foreign States.  But, at its strongest, it is a powerful legal tool capable of shaping private 
international law rules and principles.98  If one accepts the understanding of comity put forward 
in this article, there is little reason why it should not still be considered the basis for the 
obligation to recognise foreign judgments at common law. 
53 Arguably, the ‘modern position’ is based on comity.  The fundamental premise of the doctrine 
of sovereignty is that each State is obliged to respect the laws and acts of other States – 
including, the decisions of foreign courts over matters which they have competent jurisdiction.  
But the doctrine does not permit those laws and acts to have effect within the jurisdiction of 
other States.  Thus, the force of a judgment is confined to the rendering State, and if there is to 
be enforcement domestically, it must first be recognised by converting it to a domestic 
judgment.  At common law this is how it has always been - legal proceedings are bought on 
the basis of a foreign judgment, and if successful, a domestic judgment will be given and this 
is what may be enforced.  In this sense it is true that a foreign judgment, of itself, may never 
                                                          
92 Murthy v Sivasjothi [1999] 1 WLR 467 (CA); Rubin v Eurofinance SA [2010] EWCA Civ 895, [2011] Ch 
133; Rubin v Eurofinance SA [2012] UKSC 46, [2013] 1 AC 236. 
93 Rubin v Eurofinance SA [2010] EWCA Civ 895, [2011] Ch 133 (judgment was reversed on grounds 
unrelated to the Court of Appeal’s remarks on comity in Rubin v Eurofinance SA [2012] UKSC 46, [2013] 1 AC 
236). 
94 Rubin v Eurofinance SA [2010] EWCA Civ 895, [2011] Ch 133 [34]-[35] (Ward LJ). 
95 Rubin v Eurofinance SA [2012] UKSC 46, [2013] 1 AC 236. 
96 Williams v Jones [1845] 153 ER 262, 13 M&W 628; Meyer v Ralli (1876) 1 CPD 358; Blohn v Desser [1962] 
2 QB 116 (Ch) 123-124 (Diplock J); Indyka v Indyka [1969] 1 AC 33 (HL) 58 (Lord Reid); Rubin v Eurofinance 
SA [2012] UKSC 46, [2013] 1 AC 236. 
97 Agbaje v Agbaje [2010] UKSC 13, 1 AC 628 [51] (Collins SCJ, judgment of the Court). 
98 ibid [51]-[54] (Collins SCJ, judgment of the Court). 
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be enforced domestically.99  What the courts have failed to note is that it is by virtue of comity 
that domestic courts recognise foreign judgments for the purpose of supporting these domestic 
judgments.  In this sense, it is difficult to argue that comity is not the basis for the obligation to 
recognise foreign judgments at common law. 
54 Of course, recognition carries with it the risk of infringing domestic sovereignty.  Thus, the 
obligation to recognise foreign judgments is tempered by the counterpart obligation to protect 
domestic sovereign interests.  Comity reconciles these interests by forming the basis for, and 
guiding the application of, the public policy exception.  As demonstrated in section 5(5.1), 
where the recognition of a foreign judgment is relied upon to assert a domestic right, 
‘considerations of comity… necessitate specific examples of [a breach of public policy] before 
any decision is made not to recognise the judgments of a foreign state.’100  By favouring 
recognition, and by narrowing the scope of refusal, comity is able to reflect the judicial need 
to recognise foreign judgments and the political need to uphold sovereignty. 
7. Judicial Cooperation 
55 Comity plays a significant, but perhaps greatly undervalued role, in the area of judicial 
cooperation.  In judicial cooperation cases, courts are increasingly turning to comity to 
determine whether they should request assistance, or accede to a request, from foreign courts.  
If a foreign court request judicial assistance, comity favours acceding to the request where the 
relief sought is capable of being granted under domestic law.  By the same token, comity 
restricts courts from requesting assistance from foreign courts where they are aware that the 
foreign court has no power to make such an order.101  Modern case law demonstrates a real 
willingness on behalf of domestic courts to assist foreign courts whenever possible and make 
requests to foreign courts when necessary.102 
56 Whilst comity will be relevant in all cases of judicial cooperation it has become increasingly 
important in two types of cases.  The first is where a foreign court requests a domestic court to 
make pre-trial discovery orders in support of foreign proceedings; and the second is where a 
                                                          
99 A. BRIGGS, 354. Hague Lectures 2011, pp. 149-150. 
100 Yukos Capital Sarl v OJSC Rosneft Oil Co (No 2) [2012] EWCA Civ 855, [2014] QB 458 [151] (Rix LJ, 
judgment of the Court); Also see, Altimo Holdings and Investment Ltd v Kyrgyz Mobil Tel Ltd [2011] UKPC 7, 
[2012] 1 WLR 1804 and Al-Koronky v Time-Life Entertainment Group Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 1123, [2006] CP 
Rep 47. 
101 Minnesota v Philip Morris Inc [1998] ILPr 170 (CA); Rio Tinto Zinc Corp v Westinghouse Electric Corp 
[1978] AC 547 (HL) 611 (Lord Wilberforce). 
102 Section 7 is primarily concerned with the role of comity where a domestic court has been requested to assist a 
foreign court.  However, there is no shortage of cases where a domestic court has relied on comity to request 
assist from a foreign court.  See most notably, Von Mitchke-Collande v Kramer [2005] EWHC 977 (QB) where 
the Court request assistance from the Swiss judiciary concerning an issue of Swiss law.  Burton J held [2-3]: 
‘The issues that require to be decided… are all matters of Swiss law.  They are, it appears clear to me, matters 
which could be decided with considerable ease by a Swiss court, being short points of law and practice familiar 
to the Swiss courts, not involving any resolution of disputed fact, but they would cause great difficulty for an 
English court, even assisted by Swiss legal experts… In these modern days of comity, coupled with speedy 
communications, it is in my judgment far less satisfactory for an English judge to come lamely and haltingly to 
a conclusion, when the foreign court is ready, willing and able speedily to provide the answer…  It is often the 
case in Letters of Request proceedings, for example, that recourse can be had to a speedy question posed to the 
foreign court, rather than for an attempt to be made at the answer by this court.’ 
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domestic court has been requested to grant orders in support of foreign bankruptcy and 
insolvency proceedings.  These cases are particularly interesting because they demonstrate how 
comity may be used in new, complex area of law to reconcile the disjunct between the judicial 
needs of modern international commerce and the sovereign needs of States which were formed 
in different era. 
7.1. Requests for Pre-Trial Discovery Orders 
57 Where a court is asked to grant an order for discovery in support of foreign proceedings, comity 
demands that the court approach the request positively and with intention to give it effect.  
Whilst courts may go no further than they are permitted by domestic law, they will read and 
shape letters of request with an aim to assist foreign courts.  However, even so, differences in 
legal traditions often mean that courts will struggle to give effect to certain requests because to 
do so will offend domestic sovereignty.103 
58 For example, in the case of Philip Morris Incorporated104 the Court of Appeal held that it could 
not accede to a request by the District Court of Minnesota that witnesses attend to give evidence 
in the United States because the request sought to elicit general information – something not 
permitted under domestic law.105  Woolf MR and Gibson LJ held respectively: 
... the approach of this court and other courts in this jurisdiction will be to seek to assist a foreign court 
wherever it is appropriate.  For that reason the courts will seek to give effect to a Letter of Request 
wherever this is practical.  Comity between jurisdictions demands no different an approach.106 
But the English court's natural inclination to give effect to the request must be tempered both by the 
requirements of the Act, which limit the jurisdiction of the English court to applications for an order for 
evidence (i.e. factual material required to prove or disprove allegations at trial), and by the proper 
concern of the English court that those within its jurisdiction who are called upon to give evidence will 
be fairly dealt with in the evidence gathering process, which the court may allow to be conducted here 
for the purposes of the foreign proceedings.107 
59 Agreeing, Otton LJ delivered a separate judgment only to stress the importance of comity in 
these types of cases: 
I wish only to endorse the sentiments of my Lord, the Master of the Rolls, concerning comity.  In the 
interests of comity, the courts of each country should strive, and be seen to strive, to give effect to the 
request of the courts of the other…  I have striven mightily to give effect to the request, but reluctantly, 
and for the reasons given, have been unable to do so… Given the width of the request, the formulation 
of a suitably worded limitation by this court is not, in my view, workable in the context of the proposed 
examinations.  What is required is that the request should be redrafted in different terms. 
                                                          
103 See, most notably Minnesota v Philip Morris Inc [1998] ILPr 170 (CA) 13 (Woolf MR).  Also see, First 
American Corp v Zayed [1999] 1 WLR 1154 (CA), Re State of Norway's Application [1987] 1 QB 433 (CA), Re 
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Corp [1978] AC 547 (HL). 
104 Minnesota v Philip Morris Inc [1998] ILPr 170 (CA). 
105 ibid 56, 64 (Gibson LJ). 
106 ibid 17 (Woolf MR). 
107 ibid 55 (Gibson LJ).  See also, Rio Tinto Zinc Corp v Westinghouse Electric Corp [1978] AC 547 (HL) 611 
(Lord Wilberforce) for similar comments. 
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However, my reluctance is tempered by the knowledge that the Honourable Kenneth J. Fitzpatrick [of 
the District Court of Minnesota] will readily understand the difficulties this court has faced.108 
60 The Court noted that it refused the request with regret for it had no doubt the witnesses could 
give important evidence.  But to accede to the request would be contrary to domestic law.  
Whilst the Court was ultimately unable to give effect to the request it provided guidance to the 
foreign court of the perceived defects in the request and invited it to submit a reformulated 
version it could give effect to.109 
7.2. Assistance in Bankruptcy and Insolvency Proceedings 
61 Comity has also become a leading principle where courts are asked to grant orders in support 
of foreign bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings.  Whether assistance should be given 
ultimately depend on whether there is a judicial need for assistance and its effect on 
sovereignty. 
62 There is no international unanimity on the details of bankruptcy and insolvency law.  Rather, it 
generally reflects the domestic policy of individual States.  The result is that there has been a 
trend towards the idea of ‘modified universalism’ – the idea that international insolvencies 
should be managed by a single court applying a single bankruptcy law.110  When combined 
with the principle of comity courts often find themselves under an obligation to support foreign 
proceedings. 
63 Early case law demonstrates comity’s role in this area was to ensure that courts would not 
interfere with foreign proceedings.  In 1910 Lord Dunedin held: 
Now so far as the general principle is concerned it is quite consistent with the comity of nations that it 
should be a rule of international law that if the court finds that there is already pending a process of 
universal distribution of a bankrupt's effects it should not allow steps to be taken in its territory which 
would interfere with that process of universal distribution…111 
64 However, modern case law demonstrates that bankruptcy and insolvency issues simply cannot 
be resolved by the courts of one State to the exclusion of all others.  Rather, there is a need for 
courts to actively assist one another - not just stay out of each other’s ways.  English courts 
appear to have come to this realisation after the bankruptcies or liquidations of major 
international companies such as Bank of Credit and Commerce International, Maxwell 
Communications and Lehman Brothers, all of who had business, assets and creditors in 
different jurisdictions.112   
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65 More recent case law demonstrates that courts perceive there to be a serious need for courts to 
actively support one another to ensure there is an international judicial regime in place to 
resolve these types of cases.  These same cases demonstrate that comity now demands, not only 
that courts do not interfere with foreign proceedings, but that they also actively support them 
where possible.113  For example, in the 2008 case of HIH,114 Lord Hoffman held that ‘English 
courts should, so far as is consistent with justice and UK public policy, co-operate with the 
courts in the country of the principal liquidation to ensure that all the company's assets are 
distributed to its creditors under a single system of distribution.’115  In HIH English courts had 
been asked to make an order to direct remission of assets collected in England to Australia to 
support Australian proceedings.  The question was whether the English courts should make 
such an order notwithstanding the difference between the English and Australian statutory 
regimes.  Ultimately, the House of Lords held that the remission should take place. 
66 The majority based its reasoning on the statutory power to assist foreign insolvency 
proceedings under section 426 of the Insolvency Act 1986 with Lord Hoffmann and Walker 
holding that the power also exists at common law.  Lord Hoffmann held that both the statutory 
and common law power must be interpreted in accordance with the principle of comity.  The 
effect is that whilst courts retain discretion not to give assistance, that discretion is restricted 
by the dictates of comity.116 
67 Comity’s role becomes more complex where the court is asked by one of the parties to exercise 
its judicial power in support of foreign proceedings, but that same power is not available to the 
foreign court.  There are obvious judicial reasons why a court may wish to exercise its power 
in such circumstances.  However, the question for courts in these types of cases will be – would 
the exercise of their judicial power undermine or offend the sovereignty of the foreign State? 
68 The most notable cases in this area is Cuoghi.117  In that case the claimant bought proceedings 
in Switzerland against the defendant who resided in England alleging that he had conspired to 
misappropriate funds.  It was conceded in ancillary English proceedings that there was a good 
arguable case against the defendant which would have justified a world-wide asset freezing 
order had the case been bought in England.  The difficulty was that whilst the Swiss courts had 
power to grant such an order against a person residing in Switzerland, they did not in respect 
of the defendant because he resided in England.  The question for the English court was whether 
it should restrain the defendant from disposing of assets in support of the Swiss proceedings 
where the Swiss court did not possess the same power. 
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69 Ultimately, the English court held that comity favoured exercise of the power on the basis that 
there were significant judicial reasons to do so and it would not offend Swiss sovereignty.  
Millett LJ held: 
It is a strong thing to restrain a defendant who is not resident within the jurisdiction from disposing of 
assets outside the jurisdiction.  But where the defendant is domiciled within the jurisdiction such an 
order cannot be regarded as exorbitant...  
Where a defendant and his assets are located outside the jurisdiction of the court seized of the 
substantive proceedings, it is in my opinion most appropriate that protective measures should be 
granted by those courts best able to make their orders effective.  In relation to orders taking direct 
effect against the assets, this means the courts of the state where the assets are located; and in relation 
to orders in personam, including orders for disclosure, this means the courts of the state where the 
person enjoined resides. 
I recognise that an ancillary jurisdiction ought to be exercised with caution, and that care should be 
taken not to make orders which conflict with those of the court seized with substantive proceedings.  
But I do not accept that interim relief should be limited to that which would be available in the court 
trying the substantive dispute…  By going further than the Swiss courts were prepared to go in relation 
to a defendant resident outside Switzerland, we would not be seeking to remedy any perceived 
deficiency in Swiss law, but rather to supplement the jurisdiction of the Swiss courts... 
It is becoming widely accepted that comity between the courts of different countries requires mutual 
respect for the territorial integrity of each other's jurisdiction, but that this should not inhibit a court in 
one jurisdiction from rendering whatever assistance it properly can to a court in another in respect of 
assets located or persons resident within the territory of the former.118 
70 Bingham LJ added that the order was appropriate because it did not seek to assert jurisdiction 
over any person outside the jurisdiction of the English Courts and promoted an objective which 
might reasonably be assumed to find favour with the Swiss Court.119   
71 This case has been met with mixed reactions.  Some argue that if Swiss law precludes the 
exercise of such power then it is absurd to suggest that an English Court could view its actions 
as assisting the Swiss Court.120  However, in our opinion the decision should be considered a 
particularly intelligent use of comity.  The compartmentalisation of law and regulatory power, 
by virtue of the doctrine of sovereignty, means that it will generally be considered an exorbitant 
exercise of judicial power where courts seek to assert jurisdiction over assets or persons located 
in foreign States.  However, the reality of modern international commerce requires that, in 
certain cases, these assets or persons be within reach of the court.  The problem is that there is 
a disconnect between modern international commerce and the traditional conception of 
sovereignty.  In Cuoghi, the Court held that this disconnect may be reconciled if courts in the 
State where assets or persons are located are prepared to grant protective measures in support 
of foreign proceedings.  As the Court noted, it was not seeking to remedy any perceived 
deficiency in Swiss law, which would of course be offensive to Swiss sovereignty.  Rather, it 
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was seeking to use comity as a legal tool to supplement Swiss jurisdiction and support the 
proper conclusion of the foreign proceedings.  In this sense, comity permitted the two 
jurisdictions to effectively merge for the purpose of resolving a modern international dispute 
that would have, in the past, slipped between the two. 
72 A similar decision was reached in Refco121 where the Court of Appeal granted Mareva relief in 
respect of assets in England to support foreign proceedings.122  Of particular note again is the 
judgment of Millet LJ who held that, in these types of cases, comity is able to effectively bridge 
the gap between the judicial needs of modern international commerce and the sovereign needs 
of States which were formed in a different era: 
The jurisdiction of national courts is primarily territorial, being ordinarily dependent on the presence of 
persons or assets within their jurisdiction.  Commercial necessity resulting from the increasing 
globalisation of trade has encouraged the adoption of measures to enable national Courts to provide 
assistance to one another, thereby overcoming difficulties occasioned by the territorial limits of their 
respective jurisdictions. 
Comity involves respect for the foreign courts’ jurisdiction and process…  A court which is invited to 
exercise its ancillary jurisdiction to provide assistance to the court seized of the substantive 
proceedings need feel no reluctance in supplying a want of territorial jurisdiction but for which the 
other court would have acted.  But it should be very slow to grant relief which the primary Court would 
not have granted even against persons present within its own jurisdiction and having assets there.123 
73 In both Cuoghi and Refco Millet LJ’s understanding of comity allowed him to surmount the 
difficulties poses by the doctrine of sovereignty without infringing its traditional conception.124  
In Motorola Credit Corp125 the Court of Appeal noted that these types of cases lay ‘at the 
creative edge of a divide between comity and exorbitancy’.126  Ultimately, it is for the courts 
to determine whether the exercise of judicial power in these types of cases will be considered 
exorbitant.  But, the case law suggests that an informed understanding of comity may provide 
courts with the tools they need to appropriately exercise their power in difficult cases. 
74 Inside the European Union, insolvency proceedings are largely governed by EU Regulation 
2015/848 (Insolvency Regulation).  Article 52 relevantly provides that: 
Where the court of a Member State [where the main proceedings are on-foot] appoints a temporary 
administrator in order to ensure the preservation of a debtor's assets, that temporary administrator shall 
be empowered to request any measures to secure and preserve any of the debtor's assets situated in 
another Member State, provided for under the law of that Member State, for the period between the 
request for the opening of insolvency proceedings and the judgment opening the proceedings.  
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75 Whilst Article 52 places no obligation upon English courts to accede to such requests, 
considerations of comity suggest that they ought to approach any request for assistance 
positively and with a view to giving it effect.  Of course, English courts may go no further than 
they are permitted under domestic law.  However, the inclusion of Article 52 suggests that 
Member States may see the benefit of orders such as those contemplated in Cuoghi and Refco 
and that considerations of comity ought not to preclude English courts from granting such 
orders in the future. 
8. Conclusion 
76 Lord Collins, speaking from extensive experience at the Bench, has noted that in practice 
comity continues to play an important role in the resolution of private international law 
disputes.127  In his words, the importance attributed to comity by the judiciary makes the 
principle ‘worthy of further academic research’ in its own right.  However, his Lordship has 
also warned that if comity is to be of any real use then the case law requires synthesis.128  This 
article has sought to answer that call.  By synthesising the case law, and removing some of the 
confusion surrounding the concept, this article has sought to unbridle comity’s legal potential 
and reposition it as an important principle of English private international law worthy of further 
academic research. 
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